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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

AMERICAN HOLDING COMPANY,
A Utah Corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

)

Case No.

PARKER G. HANSON and GARDA P.

11743

HANSON, His Wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff and appellant by its Complaint sought to
have the court concel and terminate an Agreement TO
Lease, a copy of which is attached to the Complaint and
is made a part thereoff by reference, on three alleged
grounds: (A) Failure of lessees to pay rent called for
by the Agreement To Lease; (B) Failure to pay, before
delinquency, utility bills incurred by lessees at the
leased premises; and (C) Failure of lessees to pay, before delinquency, taxes levied on lessees' personal property situated in the leased premises, through proceedings
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initiated after defendants had paid all utility bills and
all taxes levied on lessees' personal property, to date,
and after defendants had tendered payment of all arrearages in rent, and without the plaintiff and appellant,
assignee of the original lessor, taking any steps or doing
anything towards compliance with the requirements of
Utah's "Unla\vful Detainer" statute 78-36-3 U.C.A. 1953,
and in particular with subdivisions (3) and (5) thereof.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiff and appellant filed, served and argued a
Motion For Summary Judgment as prayed for in the
plaintiff's Complaint, and the defendants and respondents filed, served and argued a Motion For Summary
Judgement of No Cause of Action in favor of the defendants. The lower court thereafter and on June 28, 1969,
made an Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and found, concluded and ordered as
follows: "From the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and
other documents on file herein and received in evidence,
the court fmds and concludes that there is no genuine
issue as to the material facts of this matter and that the
defendants are entitled to judgment of no cause of action
as a matter of law. Accordingly, it is so ORDERED,
and the defendants' motion for summary judgment is
granted."
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and appellant seeks reversal of the Order
of the lower Court granting defendants' and respondents'
Motion For Summary Judgment.
STA TEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants and respondents are lessees of the premises described in the Complaint under and by virtue of a
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document entitled Agreement To Lease, dated 10th day
of April, 1961, a copy of which is attached to the Complaint and is made a part thereof by reference. The lease
is for a term of ten years beginning on the 30th day of
l\Iay, 1961.
On December 11, 1968, an instrument called NOTICE
OF TERMINATION AND TO QUIT, signed by the plaintiff's attorney, a photostatic copy of which is attached
to defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment, was
served on each of the defendants (Deposition of Parker
G. Hanson pages 21 and 25). This instrument stated in
substance that the Agreement To Lease and Agreement
To Option therein referred to "is terminated and cancelled on the grounds that you (the defendants) have
failed to pay the lease payments as called for therein,
have failed to pay utility bills as called for therein, and
for other grounds." The instrument demanded that the
defendants within 15 days quit said premises and deliver
possessions of the same to American Holding Company or
its authorized representative, or action would be taken
for their removal.
Prior to the time when said Notice Of Termination
And To Quit was served upon the defendants, and on
December 4, 1968, the defendants mailed to the plaintiff
by U. S. certified mail in a sealed envelope addressed
to the plaintiff at its address in St. George, Utah, and
deposited in the mail box at the post office in St. George,
Utah, a check made by the defendants to the plaintiff for
all rentals which had become due from the defendants
to the plaintiff under the Agreement To Lease, which had
not theretofore been paid by the defendants to the
plaintiff, namely, a check for all rentals for the period
from March 1, 1968, to November 30, 1968, a period of
eight months. (Parker G. Hanson's Deposition P. 6, 7, 20,
:n - and D2fendants' Affidavit in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment Par. 7). Plaintiff
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was given notice by the St. George postal authorities
that the certified letter from the Parkers addressed to
the plaintiff was at the post office being held for the
plaintiff. The president of the plaintiff corporation,
Maeser W. Terry, knew the certified letter was at the
St. George post office and testified he had reason to believe and did believe that the envelope contained payment of the back rent owed by the Parkers to the plaintiff, and that he and the assistant secretary for the
plaintiff, who usually called at the post office for plaintiff's mail, refused to take such certified letter out of
the post office. (Maeser W. Terry's Deposition pages 9
and 10, and Parker G. Hanson's Deposition pages 20, 21
and 22).
All rental which accrued prior to March 1, 1968,
had been previously paid by the defendants and accepted
by the plaintiff (Maeser Terry's Affidavit attached to
plaintiff's Motion For Summary Judgment).
On December 21, 1968, the certified letter, which had
been mailed by defendants to plaintiff on December 4,
1968, was returned "unclaimed" to the defendants. On
December 24, 1968, the defendants approached the president of the plaintiff corporation, Maeser W. Terry, at
American Holding Company's office in St. George and
offered to pay to him all past due rent owed by the defendants to American Holding Company, either by check
or by cash, which cash was exhibited and offered to him,
providing he had any objection to taking defendants'
check. The president of the plaintiff corporation refused
to accept the same. Defendants made several other
tenders of past due rent, and tenders of current monthly
rentals as they became due for several months after December, 1968, both in the form of checks and currency,
to the president of the plaintiff corporation, all of which
said president of the plaintiff corporation refused to accept. (Parker G. Hanson's Deposition Pages 22, 23 and
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first 9 lines of Page 24. Also last 16 lines of Page 7 and
first J 6 lines of Page 8 of Deposition of Maeser W. Terry). Defendants in paragraph 4 of their Affidavit attached to defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment
made a continuing offer to pay into court for the plaintiff all back rental and all current rentals to become due
under said Agreement To Lease.
The utility bill which the plaintiff complains about.
as not havingg been paid when due, is a bill of $97.34 for
electric power used by the defendants at the leased
p1,emises during the months of October and November,
1968. These utility bills become due on the 15th day of
the month next following the month during which they
were incurred. This entire amount was paid by the defendants to St. George City during the forenoon of December 11, 1968, before defendants were served with
said "Notice of Termination and To Quit" which service was made on the afternoon of December 11, 1968.
(Parker G. Hanson's Deposition beginning at line 21 of
Page 25 and ending with line 15 Page 26). This entire
amount was paid about one month before plaintiff's
Complaint was filed on January 10, 1969.
The bill for taxes for the year 1968 in the amount
of S97.56, levied on personal property owned by the defendants situated on the leased premises, complained
about by the plaintiff, became delinquent on November
30, 1968 These taxes were paid in full on or about December 5, 1968, by defendants' check dated November
30, 1968, but not mailed to the County Treasurer of
Washington County until December 4, 1968. (Parker
G. Hanson's Deposition beginning with line 10, Page 9
and ending with line 22, Page 9). This was some six days
before plaintiff served said "Notice of Termination and
To Quit" on the defendants, and more than a month
prior to the filing of plaintiff's Complaint on January
10, 1969.
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No notice in writmg was ever given by the plaintiff to the defendants as required by Section 78-36-3(3)
U.C.A. 1953, pertaining to alleged failure of defendants
to pay rent when due, and no notice in writing was ever
given by the plaintiff to the defendants as required by
Section 78-36-3 (5) U.C.A. 1953, pertaining to the alleged
failure of the defendants to pay utility bills incurred by
them at the leased premises when due, or pertaining to
the claimed failure of the defendants to pay taxes on
defendants' pExsonal property situated on the leased
premises when due (Paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of defendants'
Affidavit attached to defendants' Motion For Summary
Judgment). These statements were sworn to by the defendants under oath and stand uncontradicted.
ARGUMENT
It is the position of the defendants and respondents
that when the facts above set forth had been established of record by the pleadings, the depositions, affidavits
and other documents on file herein, that the defendants
were entitled to an Order granting their Motion For a
Summary Judgment of No Cause of Action, as was made
by the lower court.
It is the law in Utah that unless a lessee for a definite term specifically waives in the lease his right to
the same, that the landlord must give the tenant written
notice and make written demand for the payment of
alleged past due rent, specifying the rental which the
landlord claims is in default, and demand in the alternative that the tenant pay the past due rent or surrender the demised premises within three days, and that
such demand remain uncomplied with for three days
after service of such notice and demand, before the
landlord can maintain an action for cancellation of the
lease and for an order ousting the tenant from the
premises. 78-36-3 (3) U.C.A. 1953.
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King v. Firm. - 285 P 2d 1114; 3 U. 2d 419
4. A landlord may not, without express consent of
tenant, repossess property without resorting to remedies
provided in forcible entry and detainer statute.
Black v. McLendon - 308 P 2d 300 (Okl. 1957)
4. Right to elect to forfeits for nonpayment of rent
does not arise until demand for rent has been made and
payment refused, unless waiver of demand for payment
of rent is provided for by lease.
5. Under lease providing that tenant waived notice
of election to forfeit and demand of possession, landlord had no right to declare lease forfeited for nonpayment of rent, vvithout demanding payment of rent due.
Note: By the terms of the least in this Oklahoma
case, the lessee waived notice of almost everything (see
wording of the Lease), but did not expressly waive demand for payment of delinquent rent, and the court
held that without such demand having been made and
having not been complied with for the statutory period,
that a suit for cancellation of the lease and for an order
ousting the tenant from the property could not be
maintained.
The Lease in our case contained no provision vvherein or whereby the tenants (defendants herein) waived
the requirements of the Utah statute above cited (7836-3 (3) U.C.A. 1953. In fact the provision of this Lease
relating to the termination for nonpayment of rent expressly provides for termination of the Lease only by
proper notice of such breach. Proper notice means the
notice required by the Utah statute. The full provision
of the Lease in our case relating to termination for nonpayment of rent in Paragraph 6 as follows' "6. In the
event the Hansons fail, neglect or refuse to pay the
rentals as above set forth, the company may terminate
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this lease by proper notice of said breach, or may consider the lease in full force and effect and proceed by
legal means to collect the same, and any costs incurred
in so doing, including reasonable attorney's fee, shall
be paid by Hansons." Clearly there is no waiver of the
notice aid demand required by the Utah Statute above
quoted, contained in said Agreement To Lease. The
Lease in our case expressly requires proper notice be
given, and nowhere therein did the lessees waive the demand in the alternative required by the Utah statute.
The document entitled "Notice of Termination and
to Quit" which was served on the defendants in our case
clearly did not comply with the requirements of the
Utah Statute 78-36-3(3) U. C. A. 1953 perta:ining to the
cancellation of the Lease for nonpayment of rentals
when due. In substance it stated, your Lease is terminated and cancelled and you are given 15 days to quit
and deliver possession of the leased premises to American Holding Company or court action will be taken for
your removal.
It is odvious why the plaintiff and appellant did not
wish to comply with the requirements of the Utah statute above cited, by giving the defendants notice in writing of the rent which plaintiff claimed was past due
and remained unpaid, and demanding in the alternative
that the defendants either pay the rent or surrender
the leased premises within three days. The president and
assistant secretary of the plaintiff had received a
written notice from the post office at St. George that it
had a certified letter from the Parkers addressd to
American Holding Company which they had refused on
advice of plaintiff's counsel to take out of the post office,
and which the president of the plaintiff corporation
testified he had reason to believe and did believe contained the past due rent money. (Maeser W. Terry's Deposition Pages 9 and 10). The officers of the plaintiff
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knew that if the plaintiff served the notice and demand
required by the Utah Statute on the defendants that
they would have immediately inquired why the plaintiff had not received the check covering full payment of
all past due rent, which had been mailed to the plaintiff by certified mail, and upon learning of their refusal
to accept the certified mail, they would have again tendered to the plaintiff the entire past due rent, both in
the form of defendants' check and in cash, as the defendants did promptly after the postal authorities had
informed the defendants that American Holding Company had refushed to accept the certified letter and had
returned the same to the defendants.
The Agreement To Lease is silent pertaining to any
right of the lessor to cancel and terminate the Lease for
nonpayment of utility bills incuffed by the lessee,
promptly when due, or for nonpayment of taxes on the
lessees' personal propeTty situated on the leased premises, promptly when due. The Lease most certainly contains no waiver, by the lessees, of the necessity of complience by the lessor, or its assigns, with the requirements of Utah's unlawful detainer statute applicable
thereto, before an action could be maintained by the
lessor on either of these grounds. The applicable provision of our statute is 78-36-3 (5) \vhich provides substantially that a landlord who wishes to cancel a lease for
a term of years, on grounds other than those thereinbefore mentioned, that such landlord must give the tenant notice in writing specifying the default complained
of and demanding in the alternative that the tenant
correct the default or surrender possession of the premises within three days. That the tenant within three
days after the service of such notice upon him, may
perform such condition or covenant and thereby
the lease from forfeiture.

10
Obviously the "Notice of Termination and To Quit"
which was served on the defendants did not meet the
requirements of the applicable statute.
As heretofore pointed out all utility bills incurred
by the lessees at the leased premises, and all taxes levied on the personal property of the lessees situated on
the leased premises had all been paid, although a little
late, before the document entitled "Notice of Termination and To Quit" was served upon the defendants, and
approximately one month before the Complaint was
filed on January 10, 1969.
Forfeitures of Leases or other contracts are not
favored, either in law or in equity, and provisions relating thereto should be strictly construed against the party seeking to invoke such forfeitures. The following
cases support this rule:
VAN ZYVERDEN v. FARRAR. - 393 P 2d 468; 15 UT 2d
367.
3. Unlawful detainer statutes provide severe remedy
and must be strictly complied with before cause of action thereunder may be maintained. U.C.A. 1953, 78-36-3.
'.\1URPHY v. TRAYNOR. - 135 P 2d 230; 110 Col. 466.
2. Provisions for forfeitures in contracts, such as
leases, are not favored either in law or in equity and
are to be strictly construed against party seeking to
invoke the forfeitures.
HOWARD M. SWAIN et ux v. SALT LAKE REAL EST A TE AND INVESTMENT COMPANY - 279 P 2d 709;
3 Ut. 2d 121.
2. Contracts 318. Equity is loath to enforce a forfeiture, especially when refusal to do so gives all parties
to agreement every right to which they are entitled,
and thus works no hardship upon anyone.
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The defendants still stand willing and ready to pay
into court for the plaintiff, or to pay direct to the plaintiff all rents vvhich have accrued under the Agreement
To Lease ancl which remain unpaid, as soon as the
plaintiff will accept the same. It would work a great
hardship on the defendants to have this Lease cancelled,
including their Option to Rene\', for an
ten
years, executed simultaneously therewith entitled
"Agreement To Option" referred to rn plaintiff's "Notice of Termination and To Quit" hereinabove referred to.
CONCLUSION
At the time plamtiff and appellant's Motion For
Summary Judgment, and defendants and respondents'
Motion For Summary Judgment, \Vere argued and submitted to the lower court for its decision, it was established by the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and other
documents on file and received in evidence, and now
constituting the record on appeal, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact of this case, and that
the plaintifi had no legal right to maintain this action
or to thE' reliet demanded, and that the defendants were
entitled 1o have a Summary Judgment of No Cause of
Action entered in the:ir favor, and defendants and respondents respectfully request that the decision of the
Honorable District Judge in so finding, concluding, and
granting Summary Judgment of No Cause of Action in
favor of the defendants be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted
DURHAM MORRIS
First Security Bank Bldg.,
Cedar City, Utah 84720.

